For any given order of stochastic dominance, standard concentration curves are decomposed into contribution curves corresponding to within-group inequalities, between-group inequalities, and transvariational inequalities. We prove, for all orders, that contribution curve dominance implies systematically welfare-improving tax reforms and conversely. Accordingly, we point out some undesirable fiscal reforms since a welfare expansion may be costly in terms of particular inequalities.
Introduction
Yitzhaki and Slemrod (1991) and subsequently Yitzhaki and Thirsk (1990) demonstrated that tax reforms, for pairs of commodities or multiple commodities, can be welfare improving with non-intersecting concentration curves for all additively separable social welfare functions and all increasing Sconcave social welfare functions. In 1991, they applied their technique on the extended Gini coefficient. Accordingly, if the concentration curve of good i dominates (lies above) that of good j, in other words, if there are less inequalities in good i than in good j, then an increasing tax on good j combined with a decreasing tax on good i enables decision makers to improve overall welfare or equivalently to decline overall inequalities.
When the population is partitioned in many groups, a usual way to analyze the structure of income inequalities, referring to the Gini index, is to decompose the overall inequality (see e.g. Lerman and Yitzhaki (1991) , Dagum (1997a Dagum ( , 1997b or Aaberge et al. (2005) among others) in a withingroup index G W , an average between-group index G B , and a transvariational index G T .
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The latter, being different from a residual, gauges between-group inequalities issued from the groups with lower mean incomes.
In this note, we aim at using the subgroup decomposition technique of the Gini index initiated by Lambert and Aronson (1993) in order to show that standard welfare-improving tax reforms, for pairs of commodities {i, j}, can be performed with less within-group inequalities, less betweengroup inequalities in mean, and more transvariational inequalities in good i than in good j. In other words, instead of looking for non-intersecting concentration curves, we provide stronger conditions allowing for welfareimproving tax reforms on goods {i, j} by introducing contribution curves for all determinants of overall inequality, namely: within-group, betweengroup, and transvariational contribution curves. Contrary to the results related to traditional concentration curves (see e.g. Makdissi and Mussard (2006) ), we show that, for any order, it is sufficient but not necessary that all contribution curves of good j lie above those of good i, except for the transvariational contribution curve.
The note is attacked as follows. Section 2 reviews Lambert and Aronson's (1993) Gini decomposition. Section 3 introduces notations and definitions. Section 4 explores welfare-improving tax reforms with the concept of contri-bution curves for all order of stochastic dominance. Section 5 is devoted to the concluding remarks.
Subgroup Decomposition of the Lorenz Curve
In this section, we briefly summarize the results obtained by Lambert and Aronson (1993) . Let a population Π of size n and mean income µ be partitioned into K groups: Π 1 , . . . , Π k , . . . , Π K of size n k and mean income µ k . The groups are ranked as follows:
Assume the individuals are ranked within each Π k such as the richest person of Π k−1 is just positioned before the poorest one of Π k . Then, the rank of an individual belonging to Π k is given by:
. Therefore, the within-group Lorenz curve L W (p (p k ) ) is formalized to compute inequalities within groups:
where L k (p k ) is the Lorenz curve associated with group Π k .
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The Lorenz curve between groups, L B (p), is obtained by considering that each individual within Π k earns the mean income of his group µ k such as the total income K k=1 n k µ k is redistributed among the groups:
The use of these different Lorenz curves yields the overall breakdown of the Gini index (G) in three components:
The contribution of the inequalities within groups (or the within-group Gini) is:
The contribution of the inequalities between groups in mean (or the betweengroup Gini) is:
The contribution of the transvariation between groups (or the Gini of transvariation) is:
where L(p) is the Lorenz curve associated with the global population.
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The transvariation (see Gini (1916) , Dagum (1959 Dagum ( , 1960 Dagum ( , 1961 , Deutsch and Silber (1997) , among others) brings out the intensity with which the groups are polarized. The greater the transvariation is, or equivalently, the wider the overlap between the distributions is, the lower the polarization may be.
Notations and Definitions
The Lorenz curve constitutes the basis of the preceding reasoning of decomposition. As a consequence, for any given consumption good (say j), we gauge the proportion of total consumption of j received by the first np individuals ranked by ascending order of consumption. In the sequel, we use an analogous scheme of decomposition. However, it is related to concentration curves C
We analyze the proportion of total consumption of j received by the first np individuals ranked by ascending order of income. In order to decompose concentration curves, we take recourse to the same lexicographic parade introduced by Lambert and Aronson (1993) . 
with
The decomposition technique exhibits different concentration amounts prevailing in a given population. These are related to the number of individuals within each group. Then, one obtains contribution indices, namely, within-group, between-group and transvariational contributions to the overall concentration measure. Indeed, these "population-based measures" explicitly involve the population shares of each Π k group (see e.g. Rao (1969) ). Consequently, these contribution indicators may then be helpful to address issues in the design of indirect tax reforms. For this purpose, we formalize theses contribution indices by initiating the concept of contribution curves. Note that a similar notion, used by Duclos and Makdissi (2005) , enables contribution curves of poverty measures to be conceived. 
The contribution curves coincide with second-degree stochastic dominance.
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Remark that, integrating any given contribution curve provides a precise contribution to the overall concentration index (C). For instance,
[CC jW (p)] dp yields the absolute contribution of the within-group concentration to the global amount of concentration in good j. In the same manner, one obtains the absolute contribution of between-group and transvariational concentrations, respectively, C B := 2 1 0
[CC jB (p)] dp and C T := 2 1 0
[CC jT (p)] dp, such as:
For the need of Section 4, s-order concentration curves are introduced. 4 The fact that many persons are affected by poverty or by inequality motivates the use of contribution curve concepts for dominance purposes.
5 Alternatively, one may consider, as in Aaberge (2004) , that first-order dominance is Lorenz dominance. Here, s-order dominance is related to s-concentration curves introduced in Definition 3.3.
Fiscal Reform Impacts
Let us define the environment on which we intend to obtain welfare-improving tax reforms. On the one hand, we consider the following rank dependant social welfare function (see Yaari (1987 Yaari ( , 1988 ):
where 
where
(·) being the function itself. Finally, we restrict our study on the following class of social welfare functions:
Suppose the government plans a decreasing tax on good i with an increasing tax on good j, letting his budget constant. This marginal tax reform entails a variation in equivalent income F −1 (p) for an individual at rank p:
As shown by Besley and Kanbur (1988) , the change in the equivalent income induced by a marginal change in the tax rate of good i is:
where x m (p) dp. Yitzhaki and Slemrod (1991) prove that constant producer prices induce:
Wildasin (1984) interprets α as the differential efficiency cost of raising one dollar of public funds by taxing the j-th commodity and using the proceeds to subsidize the i-th commodity. Substituting (11) and (10) in (9) yields:
Following Definition 3.1, equation (12) can be rewritten as:
Consequently, following H1, the variation of social welfare induced by an indirect tax reform is:
Theorem 4.1 A revenue-neutral marginal tax reform,
for any given s ∈ {2, 3, 4, . . .}, if and only if
+ αCC
Proof. See the Appendix. Note that the specification of within-group contribution curves brings out the average within-group inequalities. It turns out that, it would be appealing to formalize a taxation technique ensuring decision makers that welfareimproving tax reforms reduce inequalities within all subgroups. Indeed, this condition is not guaranteed in Theorem 4.1, for which within-group inequalities in mean may only be reduced for good j (if αCC
for α ≤ 1). Subsequently, if we were able to construct within-group contribution curves for all groups Π k , k ∈ {1, 2, . . . , K}, (say CC s−1 jW,k for the j-th commodity) and to find a couple of goods {i, j} that guarantees dominance between within-group contribution curves for all Π k , then we could find a welfare-improving tax reform that decreases inequalities within each group. This outcome culminates in the following theorem. 
Theorem 4.2 A revenue-neutral marginal tax reform, dt
Proof. It is straightforward. (S 1 ) This first solution postulates that all within-group contribution curves of good j dominate those of good i, provided the former is multiplied by α. The condition is that the dominance sum is sufficiently important compared with the remaining terms. Then, an increasing tax on good j, for which the repartition is favorable to rich people, coupled with a decreasing tax on good i produces systematically an overall welfare improvement with alleviation of inequalities within each group, for any s-order stochastic dominance.
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(S 2 ) If the between-group contribution curve of the j-th commodity (multiplied by α) lies above that of the i-th commodity, provided Eq. (16) remains positive, then an increasing tax on the j-th commodity coupled with a decreasing tax on the i-th commodity yields necessarily an increase of welfare with a between-group inequality reduction, for any s-order stochastic dominance.
(S 3 ) The third case is an atypical one. Indeed, welfare-improving tax reforms might be performed with a reduction in transvariational inequalities. Nevertheless, as depicted in Figure 1 , it is not a desirable issue. Following Figure 1 , when two distributions overlap, inequalities of transvariation are recorded. This particular concept, inspired from Gini (1916) and subsequently developed by Dagum (1959 Dagum ( , 1960 Dagum ( , 1961 , characterizes the income differences between the group of lower mean income (G 1 ) and that of higher mean income (G 2 ). Transvariation means that between-group differences in incomes are of opposite sign compared with the difference in the income average of their corresponding group. It is closely connected with economic distances (see e.g. Dagum (1980) ), stratification indices (see e.g. Lerman and Yitzhaki (1991) ) or polarization measures (see e.g. Duclos, Esteban and Ray (2004)). Therefore, S 3 suggests that welfare-improving tax reforms can be achieved with a growing transvariation (reduction of polarization) between the groups. 6 Other constraints are available for S 1 . For instance, αCC
iT (p) ≥ 0, may be viewed as a stronger variant. This remark also holds for S 2 .
Finally, decision makers can contemplate doing welfare-improving tax reforms subject to the reduction of within-group inequalities, subject to the decline of between-group inequalities or subject to the expansion of transvariational inequalities. However, stronger welfare-increasing tax reforms may be performed in a combinatoric way: αCC This necessarily implies a welfare gain with alleviation of within-group and between-group inequalities and with transvariational expansion. The reverse being not true. 
Concluding Remarks
The employ of rank dependent social welfare functions is well-suited for the respect of ethical properties such as Pigou-Dalton transfers (Pigou (1912) ), a set {Ak} of taxation schemes (Gajdos (2002) ), uniform α-spreads (Gajdos (2004) ), or the principle of positionalist transfers (see e.g. Zoli (1999) and Aaberge (2004) ). For the latter, for all W (·) ∈ Ω s , an income transfer from a higher-income individual to a lower-income one (say a progressive transfer) yields a better impact on social welfare as far as individuals' ranks are the lowest as possible. For instance, when s = 2, a progressive transfer occurs. For s = 3, one gets composite transfers, that is, a progressive transfer arising at the bottom of the distribution combined with a reverse progressive transfer at the top. Higher-order principles can be illustrated with Fishburn and Willig's (1984) general transfer principle, for which composite transfers occur both at the bottom and at the top of the distribution. Accordingly, one should analyze, not independently, indirect tax reforms and the implication of the dominance ethical properties resulting from the social welfare function. Therefore, if the s-concentration curve of good i dominates that of good j, then s-order dominance and welfare-improving tax reforms may be interpreted as direct tax programs favorable to lower-income persons coupled with indirect tax programs, such as an increasing tax on the j-th commodity (also favorable to lower-income earners) with a decreasing tax on the i-th commodity, implying an overall welfare expansion.
In a more general fashion, we point out undesirable welfare-improving tax reforms, especially when s-concentration curves are not decomposed. Indeed, as the welfare amplification possesses three inequality counterparts characterized by the contribution curves, it turns out that a fiscal reform may be costly in terms of particular consumption inequalities. Accordingly, it seems reasonable to perform welfare-increasing tax reforms in being aware of the underlying inequality entailments: variation of the inequalities within each group, variation of the inequalities between groups and variation of the transvariational inequalities.
Finally, the methodology allows one to deal with Gini social welfare functions that depend on an inequality aversion parameter. This might contribute to shed more light on the possibility for the social planner to adjust the power of the tax reform in function of the inequality aversion. good i. Indeed, remark that for any given consumption variable x, ranked by ascending order of income, 1 0
x(p)dp is an approximation of the arithmetic mean µ. Using the formulae of the sum of trapeze areas, we have:
x(p)dp =
. Individual data en-
x(p)dp = , and where P (0) = 0 and P (1) = 1. From Definition 3.1, it is easy to see that
and suppose that these contribution curves are first-order curves, that is, C 
Order l: Integrating (A4) for goods i and j leads to:
Thus, for the order l = 1, the social welfare variation is:
(p) dp.
Applying the same induction reasoning as in Theorem 4.1 and the same necessary condition produces the desired result for any given s-order stochastic dominance and for all α ≤ 1.
